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case-by-case basis due to technical, political, and other factors. Instead of pre-identifying the places of refuge, their contingency arrangement in this regard usually identifies the responsibilities and procedures to assist the decision-making process. Countries taking this approach include Spain, Australia, and Canada. Nevertheless, there are also some countries that have specified conditions to be met before a ship can use a port of refuge and, while conditions relating to the safety of nearby residents are understandable, conditions demanding that financial security of punitive nature be paid before allowing entry are likely to be counterproductive.
-Location of the Incident
The location of an incident can have a significant effect on the outcome of a response. The outcome can depend on differences in the general attitude adopted by those resident in the country affected by the incident, or on more local factors, such as weather, resources at risk, and whether the incident has occurred near-shore or far off-shore. Geographically, the location of the incident influences the type of response that can be provided as well as dictates the logistical support required. By way of example, even a relatively small quantity of oil released near populated coastal areas will attract significant attention. Whereas an incident occurring far off-shore and in rough sea conditions is likely to attract much less attention, particularly if no sensitive resources are involved.
In addition to the geographic influences, the general attitudes and expectations of the local population vary significantly across the world, which in turn can influence both the response measures undertaken and the perceived success of the response. In some cases, this attitude may depend on the extent to which the population is reliant upon the shipping or oil industry, with those recognising their own dependency on these industries appearing to be more understanding. However, in some countries the population may have unrealistically high 6 expectations of what can be achieved from a response. In such countries the success of a response is more likely to be judged according to the amount of equipment and manpower used or money paid by those deemed to be responsible. Whilst neither attitude should be viewed as right or wrong undoubtedly, the criteria applied in a country of high expectations will make it more difficult for a response to be judged a success. 
-Trust and Respect
The existence of trust and respect between the parties involved in a response might appear to be obvious criteria for a successful response. Nevertheless, these qualities are amongst the first to be eroded during an actual incident. Accident investigations and potential litigation may cause parties to become guarded and less trusting of those viewed as being 'on the other side'.
It is not unusual to find parties on all sides co-operating during the very early stages of an 7 incident as all are working towards the same objective of minimising pollution damage and doing their utmost to deal with the issues to hand. However, as soon as focus turns away from the immediate issues and towards the 'blame game' and what is to be gained and lost from the incident, sides begin to be taken, decisions and interactions become more guarded, and distance between the parties is introduced. Similarly, if the motivation behind the actions of one or other party is in question this can lead to a lack of trust. For example, if one party is viewed as trying to save money and another is viewed as trying to make money, actions will be viewed with suspicion and may result in stances being adopted that exacerbate the situation.
One way to minimise the likelihood of these qualities being eroded during an actual incident is to invest time in building relationships during 'peace-time'. As an example, shipowners, oil companies, national and local authorities, and other stakeholders who have developed an understanding of the expectations of each in the event of an incident are more likely to have a greater degree of trust and respect for each other during an actual incident.
While it might be considered naïve to imagine that trust and respect between parties on socalled 'opposing sides' can be maintained throughout an incident, the inevitable consequence of the erosion of these qualities is that incidents increasingly become antagonistic. This will only result in increased litigation and delays in restoration and compensation -the very objectives that both parties should be keen to resolve quickly and amicably so as to limit the consequences of the incident.
-Co-operation
Closely linked to the previous point, parties are much more likely to work co-operatively if trust and respect exists and also if goals and objectives are aligned. But what does co-operation mean in practice? Defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, co-operation is 'the action or process of working together to the same end'. Depending on the scale and location of the 8 incident, the co-operation required could be at the local, national or international level and may involve collaboration among many different interested parties and departments.
Given that oil, once spilt, respects no boundaries it is prudent for adjoining coastal States that share the same regional sea area to establish a co-operation mechanism to ensure a rapid and effective response. A well-established international co-operation mechanism can also optimise the building and maintenance of the response resources, e.g. fleet, specialised In addition to promoting international collaboration, the 'spirit' of co-operation is essential.
Clearly, true co-operation can only exist when parties are working towards the same goals, transparently, and in a manner in which each is prepared to give and take without ulterior motive. Duties should neither be abdicated nor abused. Nevertheless, experience of some incidents suggests that co-operation is interpreted as ensuring that one or other party agrees to undertake all that is demanded of it. By way of example, advocates of co-operative NRDA in the USA maintain that this process is helpful and paves the way to a quicker, more amicable settlement of damages. However, critics argue that the process amounts merely to a 'pay to play' situation with no genuine intent to co-operate in the truest sense. Whilst, it might be 9 considered unrealistic to expect true co-operation, like trust and respect, as it deteriorates so does the likelihood of a successful response.
A good level of co-operation was demonstrated during the response to the grounding of MV GULSER ANA on the south coast of Madagascar in 2009, which resulted in a considerable loss of fuel oil and rock phosphate cargo. Despite the limitations related to the remote location an effective response was made possible due to the co-operative approach adopted by all those involved in the response, both national and international. (Laruelle, F. 2012).
-Communication
The importance of communication has been highlighted in almost every study addressing human interaction but its importance can hardly be overstated during an emergency response.
Discounting the potential misunderstandings arising from language and cultural differences, even communication in the same language can be fraught with difficulties, especially at times of heightened tension. This is where the time spent defining the roles and responsibilities of departments and individuals in the contingency planning stage, and the investment in rigorous and regular testing of these plans during drills and exercises, pays off. Different management systems have been adopted in different parts of the world, most of which have evolved according to local preferences and previous incident experience. 6 Irrespective of whether or not a country follows the Incident Command System as in the USA, having a clearly defined command and control structure in place will significantly reduce the opportunity for misinformation and confusion. The incident involving the containership, MV GODAFOSS serves as an example of the benefit of good communication. The ship ran aground in February 2011 near Asmaløy Island of Norway, 15 km away from the Swedish border in charge to remain focussed on the technical aspects of the incident and not to be coerced into taking action that could deviate from the purpose. Nevertheless, knowing how to positively engage the press, politicians and the public could help to keep the situation under control and pave the way for a successful response. Providing timely, concise and accurate information on the development and response to the spill can transform the press into a vehicle to engage the public, as illustrated in point 6 by the actions of the NCA during the GODAFOSS incident.
Other approaches include emphasis on the appropriate level of public engagement after a spill happens, such as the recently published guideline as part of the ARCOPOL Plus project.
14 A realistic and well-structured volunteer management programme can also provide a way to enable the public to make a positive contribution to the spill response (Tucker and O'Brien, 2011) and so diminish destructive speculation, which could otherwise undermine the response.
-Willingness to Learn
Real incidents provide no better opportunity to reflect on the actions taken and learn from them. Debriefings can be held at different levels amongst those involved in the response, and the key is to hold them as soon as possible after the incident and to be honest and objective.
Too many incident debriefings are clouded by a fear of recrimination if failings are exposed and, in which case, they become little more than a 'back slapping' exercise, where the real issues and lessons that could be learnt, are buried. Following an independent review of the response to the MV RENA in New Zealand various recommendation were made concerning the National Contingency Plan. to enhance spill preparedness and spill response (Bergaplass and Eriksen, 2012) . The drive to learn and improve preparedness may also come from the response industry. Following the HEBEI SPIRIT incident, the Korea Marine Environment Management Corporation (KOEM), the nationwide organisation for marine environment management, including spill response, has strengthened its stockpiles. KOEM has also established a dedicated spill simulation wave pool for research and training in spill response.
A willingness to learn from past incidents feeds directly back into the first point made in this paper, namely, 'Preparedness'. Deciding the objectives of exercises and developing a realistic scenario to test these will be important; too easy a scenario may lead to a false sense of security, whereas too difficult a scenario may lead to a sense of chaos and disengagement on the part of those involved. Sometimes exercises are used more as an opportunity to 'show off' the equipment that is held rather than to really test its deployment. The consequence of this is that responders may be somewhat embarrassed on the day that the equipment is needed in earnest and found not to perform as expected. If benefit is to be gained from training to improve preparedness, taking note of the lessons learnt from past incidents will be important.
CONCLUSIONS
It could be argued that the points identified in this paper are obvious and highlight nothing new. However, if that is the case, then why do the same issues crop up time and time again?
Given that human behaviour and psychology underlie many of the points discussed in this paper perhaps one answer is that we have learnt to accept certain behaviour as the norm and not to challenge it. For example, it might be tempting to 'pigeon hole' polluters as always trying to avoid their responsibilities, claimants as always trying to exaggerate their losses, governments or politicians as always trying to appease the public etc. Using business planning terminology, the ten points identified in this paper might be referred to as Critical Success Factors (CSFs) meaning, factors that one really needs to get right to achieve success. In the same way that a Strategic Plan is critical to the success of a business so a Contingency Plan is critical to the success of a response. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that top of the priority list in this paper is Preparedness. To prepare a Strategic Plan a business needs to focus on where it would like to be (or how it would wish to be regarded) in the future and consider the actions necessary to achieve this. Businesses know that for a Strategic Plan to be successful they need to communicate its goals effectively to their staff and stakeholders and part of this process will involve addressing attitudes and perceptions. While the timelines may be different consideration of attitudes and perceptions that could affect the success of a response at the contingency planning phase would not go amiss. Even if those leading the response were able to reflect on this question at the outset of a response it could help to identify key areas that may benefit from attention.
Ultimately, in answer to the question, 'What Makes a Good Response', it is having a good attitude -a good attitude to each and every one of the ten points listed in this paper. Considering this simple conclusion, perhaps it is no bad thing to go back to basics and to reflect on whether negative attitudes or prejudice has crept into spill response and, instead, start with a clean sheet and an open mind. To quote Theodore Roosevelt. "With self-discipline most anything is possible".
